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X MARKS THE SPOT: NEW TECHNOLOGIES
COMPEL NEW CONCEPTS FOR
COMMERCIAL LAW
Patricia Brumfield Fry*
I. INTRODUCTION: COMPUTERIZATION OF TRANSACTION
PROCESSING REQUIRES EVALUATION OF PAPER
REQUIREMENTS IN COMMERCIAL LAW
Predictions of a paperless society have been around for years-so
many years that many of us no longer pay much attention. In spite of all
the prophesying, people still write checks, send letters and reduce agree-
ments to paper. Office supply stores and catalogs are filled with pads of
standard form purchase orders, invoices, notes and leases, which are
ready for the small business to purchase.
While paper has not disappeared-and shows few signs of doing
so-some of the prophets' predictions of a paperless society have come
and will continue to come to pass. We may not eliminate paper in the
foreseeable future, but a constantly increasing stream of transactions are
consummated without the use of a single piece of paper. Still more are
consummated in reliance on information transmitted electronically, and
pieces of paper are generated after the fact only to be placed in over-
stuffed filing cabinets and forgotten.
Currently, approximately five percent of sales transactions are con-
ducted through the use of standardized computer-to-computer communi-
cations. In the paper-based sales transaction familiar to most of us, a
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clerk inserts information into blanks on standardized paper forms, copies
of which are sent to trading partners and relevant intracompany depart-
ments, such as shipping and accounting. Not too long ago the paper
form would have been mailed to the addressee; today it may be faxed. In
other situations, the information may be telephoned and the papers filled
out and mailed (or faxed) only after a verbal agreement has been reached.
In any of these scenarios, the paper may be stored in a filing cabinet, or
the information may be scanned into a computer and stored on disc.
In a firm using computer-to-computer methods, standard forms are
completed on the computer screen by clerical workers and then transmit-
ted via modem to the intended recipient. The recipient's computer will
receive the data contained in these standardized formats, process it, per-
haps signal acceptance of transactions and instruct the appropriate de-
partments to process the order, prepare to receive the goods and so forth.
The entire sales cycle, from bid solicitation, purchase order and ac-
ceptance, through shipment and delivery of goods and payment for them,
can be effected without the need to produce a single piece of paper. A
record of the transaction, from inception through closure, may be stored
electronically in a reliable, enduring manner, and the necessary informa-
tion may be relayed to the appropriate departments through the com-
pany's computer network. Using a computer network, the cycle may be
completed at a significant savings in processing costs, with a reduction in
processing errors by eliminating any need to transcribe information onto
new forms, and permitting information to be stored in less physical space
for a period at least as long as the life of a piece of paper. Fewer employ-
ees are required to process the information for each discrete transaction.
The efficiencies that may be achieved in this manner are critical to imple-
menting improved methods of production, such as just-in-time and
quick-response production modes.
The most obvious difference between paper-based systems and elec-
tronic systems of communicating and storing information is the existence
of paper. Electronically based technologies1 permit agreements to be put
1. The terms "electronically based technologies" and "electronic media" are used here as
a shorthand for various methods of communicating and storing information without paper.
The most obvious device in use today is the computer which, when linked to a modem, permits
data transmission from one computer to another. The facsimile machine permits an image of a
piece of paper-or information created in a computer-to be transmitted over telephone lines
to a receiving facsimile machine. If that machine is linked to the receiver's computer, the
information may appear on a computer screen; if it is not linked to a computer, the informa-
tion will be printed onto a piece of paper.
Today, information may be entered on a computer by a transcriber or copied through a
scanner. The data may be stored in the computer's memory, on a magnetic disc, compact disc
or tape. It may be communicated to others by delivering a hard copy printout or by sending
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into words, which may be communicated and stored without generating
a single piece of paper. Frequently when computers are used in this man-
ner, they are used merely as substitutes for or alternatives to paper. It
seems to take some time for users to become sufficiently comfortable with
computerized operations before they will rethink their procedures and
eliminate those that computerization has made superfluous. One simple
illustration should suffice: Typists manually address envelopes; this task
is unnecessary when a word processing program is used. Most typists
will continue to address envelopes manually when they start using word
processors and for some time thereafter.
The benefits of a memorial of a transaction may now exist without
paper; no longer does the absence of paper mean reliance on human
memory. Many of the functions formerly served exclusively by paper
may be served by relying on information stored on computer discs, tapes
and memories. Adapting to these simple facts, both operationally and
in terms of understanding the processes involved, takes time and
experience.
Parties to electronically based sales transactions believe they have
the right to expect one another to perform, deliver and pay for the goods
in a timely manner. But for commercial law assumptions of the existence
of paper, there is little reason to believe that once the fact of a transaction
is established a court would refuse to enforce it. For several years, com-
mentators have suggested various approaches to resolve the difficulties
raised by paper requirements, but each of these suggestions has turned
ultimately on the reform of commercial law to accommodate electroni-
cally based transactions.
At an ever increasing pace, commerce has begun adopting methods
of processing, communicating and storing information without paper-
on electronic media.2 As a result, some of the fundamental structures of
commercial law must now be reexamined.
The process of adapting American commercial law to new techno-
logical realities commenced with the 1977 amendments to UCC Article
the data via modem or facsimile. The communication may use the mails, telephone lines or
satellite networks. Businesses with a telephone, modem and personal computer may conduct
trade with one another without any additional sophisticated equipment.
Tomorrow, new and additional modes of communicating and storing information will
emerge and be adopted by business. Whether these new modes will rely on the electronic
technologies underlying today's methods is unknowable. What is predictable is that techno-
logical development will continue and, as additional efficiencies become affordable, commerce
will adopt them.
2. See Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data
Interchange-A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645 (1990).
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8, which recognized emerging uses of "uncertificated securities" by in-
cluding provisions governing the rights and liabilities of the issuers and
holders of interests or obligations not represented by pieces of paper.'
Some years later, Article 4A was added to the UCC explicitly to furnish
a legal structure for funds transfers, a payment system through which
billions of dollars passed without generating paper or a predictable struc-
ture of legal rules.4 Currently, drafting committees are preparing revi-
sions of Articles 2, 5 and 8. The Business Law Section of the American
Bar Association has established task forces to study the need for revising
both Article 1, which contains the basic definitions and general provi-
sions applicable throughout the UCC, and Article 7, which governs doc-
uments of title.
The emergence of electronic or computerized technologies in the
business office is not solely responsible for these increasing revision ef-
forts, but changes in commerce that implement nonpaper-based proce-
dures have significantly contributed to the recognition of the need to
modernize commercial law. This Article will review one method that
has been employed in an effort to reform existing commercial law and
will introduce a defined concept developed for incorporation into the
UCC.
II. WHAT IS WRITrEN IS NOT CAST IN STONE: INTRODUCING A
NEW CONCEPT TO COMMERCIAL LAW
When the Code initially was offered to the states for enactment,
computers were large, unwieldy, expensive pieces of equipment that had
not yet found general commercial acceptance for routine operations.
Some preliminary experiments were underway,5 but the drafters, like the
rest of the legal profession, could not know how electronic technologies
might impact commercial law until there was experience with some com-
mercial applications. It is unremarkable, then, that existing provisions of
3. See U.C.C. §§ 8-102(1)(b), -313(l)(b), (f), (h), -313(3) (1990).
4. See kd art. 4A prefatory note. In addition, amendments were made to Articles 3 and
4, governing negotiable instruments and bank collections, to accommodate methods of auto-
mated processing of checks and other instruments that had been adopted by the banking in-
dustry since the Code was enacted. See id. art. 3 prefatory note.
5. For example, in July 1956, the American Bankers Association Technical Subcommit-
tee on Mechanization of Check Handling made its first recommendations, opting for imprint-
ing machine-readable figures on checks (which became the MICR line) to enable the use of
automated scanner readers for the processing of checks. Use of this automated system and the
encoding of checks with magnetic ink (the MICR line) became widespread in the 1960s. See
DONALD I. BAKER & ROLAND E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER
SYSTEMs % 1.02[2] (1980). The provisions of the original Articles 3 and 4 did not address this
then-emerging technology.
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the UCC are replete with assumptions of the existence of pieces of paper,
whether explicit or not.6 Whenever the law requires a piece of paper, the
law may stall and hamper the rapidly increasing flow of transactions ne-
gotiated, confirmed and transacted through fully electronic communica-
tions. The inefficiencies caused by legal requirements that transactions
be memorialized on paper can only increase as progressively more trans-
actions are accomplished through direct computer-to-computer commu-
nications. Any assumption, whether explicit or implicit, that a piece of
paper exists, represents a burden to free commercial adoption of electron-
ically based operating procedures.
For these reasons, one of the first targets for reformers has been
UCC section 1-201(46) which states: "'Written' or 'writing' includes
printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to tangible
form."7 While some commentators have argued that "any other inten-
tional reduction to tangible form" may be interpreted to include the sav-
ing of information onto a disc or drive,8 others have been less sanguine.9
6. The statutes of frauds are the obvious examples. See U.C.C. §§ 1-206, 2-201, 2A-201,
8-319. Other references to paper may be found in §§ 2-207, 5-104 and 9-203(1)(a), in the
definitions of "order" and "promise," § 3-103(a)(6), (9), and in § 9-402(1), which requires that
the debtor sign a financing statement. A number of provisions throughout the Code call for
written notice, see, eg., id § 2-609(1) (demanding written assurances of performance), and
others have been interpreted to require written notice, see, eg., id. § 9-504(3) (requiring writ-
ten notice to debtor before collateral is sold). Any random survey of Code provisions will find
numerous references to notices, sending, delivering or receiving, conspicuous terms and the
like.
7. Id § 1-201(46).
8. BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. ET AL., ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING LAW § 6.01(b), (c)
(1992); BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: EDI, FAX, AND E-
MAIL: TECHNOLOGY, PROOF, AND LIABILITY § 16.1 (1991).
9. Another provision that has received attention from the reformers is U.C.C. § 1-
201(39). That section defines "signed" as including "any symbol executed or adopted by a
party with present intention to authenticate a writing." U.C.C. § 1-201(39). Thus some com-
mentators believe that the definition, as it stands, may be interpreted to accommodate personal
identification codes or other identifiers used in computerized communications. Others disagree
and argue for revision of the definition in order to explicitly accommodate such identifiers.
The issues surrounding the meaning of "writing" and "signed" were the subject of de-
tailed discussion in REAMS ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.01; WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 16.1; and
Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra note 2, at 1679-97.
The difficulties with the tangibility element can be illustrated by examining facsimile
transmissions. In the most familiar case, the information received by a fax machine is printed
onto paper. It is possible, however, for the fax message to be received on a computer screen.
In this case, the information consists of electronic messages to a computer software package.
If the information is saved onto a computer disc, the information arguably has been reduced to
tangible form, but the form of the message itself is an unintelligible digital code stored in the
magnetic material of the disc until the message is once again retrieved on a computer screen or
printed onto paper. See REAMS ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.01; WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 16.4.4;
and Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra note 2, at 1680-97 for a general discus-
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Of immediate concern to many, moreover, is the pragmatic difficulty
posed to commerce if paper must be generated or retained before transac-
tions will be enforceable. Every piece of paper that is retained, because it
is required by law or because of uncertainty about legal requirements,
reduces the efficiencies made possible by the use of new technologies.
A. First Stage: Attempting Redefinition of Existing Concepts
One approach to writing requirements is to revise the definition of
"written" or "writing" contained in section 1-201(46).1o The revision
might explicitly include certain forms of technology, as was done in the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG).1 1 While such an approach furnishes clarity, it may be
outdated as soon as new technologies are adopted; the Convention does
not incorporate into its definition computer-to-computer communica-
tions or electronic storage of data, although both are used increasingly in
commerce.
A second method of revision would seek to devise statutory lan-
guage broad enough to incorporate future technologies as they emerge
(in other words, be media neutral). Benjamin Wright made the follow-
ing proposal in 1991:
Lawmakers could address problematic laws indirectly with
amendments to general statutory definitions. Some jurisdic-
tions have statutes that define terms used generally within the
jurisdictions' statutes.... A law such as this might, for exam-
ple, be amended to say that "writing" includes "any expression
(other than oral) of letters, numbers or codes that is, or in con-
nection with its communication from one party to another be-
comes, fixed in a tangible medium of expression." This
definition serves these purposes: (1) The "fixed in a tangible
medium" language requires a record. (2) The "letters, numbers
or codes" language requires more articulateness and delibera-
sion of ways in which electronic transaction records can satisfy the writing requirements of the
statutes of frauds.
10. Another approach that has been adopted by parties using electronic media for their
transactions has been to enter into agreements that define their transactions as satisfying writ-
ing requirements. These agreements may incorporate a number of strategies to deal with such
requirements as statutes of frauds. See, eg., Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra
note 2, at 1717-49 (model agreement).
11. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264
(1987). Article 13 states: "For the purposes of this Convention 'writing' includes telegram
and telex." Id art. 13, reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. at 6265.
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tion than oral communication. (3) The "letters, numbers, or
codes" language forces the communication to be conspicuous-
at least conspicuous enough for business transactions. This def-
inition may, however, be inappropriate for consumer transac-
tions that must be in writing. The definition may not properly
ensure that the consumer receives a message that he can easily
recognize and use.
This approach's advantage is that it covers many laws at
once. The hazard is that a handful of laws may be affected in
unforeseen ways; this requires us to rely on courts to use com-
mon sense in interpreting the definition. 2
Turning more specifically to the Uniform Commercial Code, several
revisions of the section 1-201(46) definition have been proposed. In com-
ments dated September 13, 1990, the Working Group on Electronic
Writings and Notices developed several possible revisions.1 3 Thereafter,
building upon previous proposals, John L. Crawley, Patricia M. Howe
and Benjamin Wright proposed the following revised definition: "'Writ-
ten' or 'writing' includes printing, typewriting or any other expression
(other than oral) of letters, numbers or codes that is, or in connection
with its communication from one party to another becomes, fixed in a
tangible medium of expression." 4
12. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 16.7.4 (footnote omitted). Although Mr. Wright was not
discussing the Uniform Commercial Code in this excerpt, his approach might be applied to the
definitions in UCC Article 1.
In the same chapter, Mr. Wright argues that courts and regulatory bodies could reinter-
pret existing requirements, legislatures could eliminate formal requirements from statutes or
explicitly recognize electronic methods of doing business, and industry groups could adopt
customs and practices recognizing electronic commercial practices. Id. §§ 16.7.5 -.8.
13. Working Group, Comments to ABA Study Group on the Revision of Article 2 (Sept.
13, 1990). The proposals included:
1. "Written" or "writing" includes printing, typewriting or any other expres-
sion reduced, or capable of reduction, to tangible form.
2. "Written" or "writing" includes any statement which is, or concurrently
with its transmission, becomes printed, typewritten, magnetically or optically re-
corded or otherwise reduced to tangible form.
3. "Written" or "writing" includes any statement fixed in any medium, now
known or later developed, from which the statement can be perceived, reproduced or
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
4. "Written" or "writing" includes any statement fixed, using paper or any
other tangible medium of expression, from which the statement can be perceived,
reproduced, or later communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.
Id.
14. Memorandum from John L. Crawley, Patricia M. Howe & Benjamin Wright to the
Working Group (Oct. 1991) (on file with author).
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Discussion of this series of potential definitions made several princi-
ples evident to those debating redefinition. First, any effort to revise
commercial law to incorporate new technologies needs to be media neu-
tral, rather than embracing and including specific technologies. As illus-
trated by the CISG provisions incorporating telex and telegrams,'" by
the time the drafting and adoption process has been completed, new tech-
nologies not included in the definition may be part of established com-
mercial practice. The process of drafting and adoption is too expensive
and time consuming to permit change every time a new technology
appears. 16
Second, any proposed definition should be tested against emerging
technologies and against business practices presently in use. The first
attempts to revise the definition in section 1-201(46) built upon the ex-
isting definition, but testing the 1990 proposals against existing technolo-
gies revealed flaws. While all agreed that any record would have to be
capable of being translated into readable form in the event of litigation,
there was concern that requiring "tangible form" might be read to re-
quire that a paper or other legible record be prepared at some point. It
was believed that references to "tangible form" might prove to be as
medium-specific as the CISG references to telexes and telegrams.
Even in the absence of technological developments, definitions must
be tested against existing methods of conducting business. For example,
questions were raised and time was spent debating whether "fixing" in-
formation in a medium required accurate reproduction of the informa-
tion in the format and with the content originally received, or whether it
permitted reproduction in any format provided the correct content was
available. 7
Third, any proposed definition must be tested against existing legal
principles to ensure that redefinition does not distort existing legal con-
cepts. Mr. Wright's proposal has the advantage of media neutrality but,
as he notes, presents certain hazards.' 8 Both reinterpretation and redefi-
nition appear to be attractive solutions to the problems raised by elec-
tronic media. They bring information stored on electronic media within
15. See supra note 11.
16. It might be possible to accomplish such a result by regulation. The prospect of bureau-
cratic regulation of commerce presents problems beyond the scope of this Article. This alter-
native has not been viewed with favor by the members of the Working Group.
17. Because full implementation of computer-to-computer communication for the sales
cycle involves both the buyer and seller using the data for a number of functions-for example
shipping instructions, billing or payment-it is probable that some companies using electronic
data interchange do not store the information in the same format in which it is received.
18. See WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 16.7.4.
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the concept of "writing," without requiring the expensive and time-con-
suming process of examining all the commercial law provisions and re-
vising them as needed to accommodate electronic media. Unfortunately,
on closer examination it becomes clear that these approaches are
insufficient.
Writing requirements serve a number of different functions in com-
mercial law, and some of those functions may be served better by pieces
of paper than by electronic media.19 At a minimum, it is necessary to
explore each writing requirement to ascertain the function(s) it serves
and then determine whether it is appropriate to permit the use of elec-
tronic media in light of that function. While additional functions served
by writings might be identified, any list of the functions served by writing
requirements should include:
1. Memorial and evidence of transactions. Words on paper may be
stored and retrieved in the future, if a dispute arises. The existence of a
piece of paper created, and perhaps signed, contemporaneously with a
transaction in and of itself offers some evidence that the transaction oc-
curred. In addition, the words on the paper offer evidence of the terms of
that transaction, without the necessity of relying on human memory in
order to reconstruct the transaction. Thus, such a piece of paper sup-
ports the conclusion that a transaction has occurred and assists in deter-
mining the terms of the parties' agreement. This reality permeates the
provisions of the parol evidence rule in section 2-202.20
2. Communication and notice. Words on paper may be sent by
one party and received by the other, and the law assumes each party
"knows" or has "notice" of the information contained on the paper. Nu-
merous provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code require that written
notice be given or received before obligations arise or consequences oc-
19. As noted above, any requirement that a piece of paper be generated or stored reduces
the efficiencies that may be gained through the use of computers to communicate and store
information. Proponents of expanded use of electronic media have urged that all paper re-
quirements be abolished. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that sound policy will require
the retention of some requirements for the foreseeable future, even if no negotiable instruments
are involved. For example, in order to ensure that debtors, and particularly consumer debtors,
consciously have chosen to waive their rights subsequent to a repossession, it may be wise to
retain the requirement that the debtor have signed a written waiver subsequent to default. See
U.C.C. § 9-505(2).
20. Id. § 2-202. For example, the opening paragraphs of § 2-202 refer to "a writing in-
tended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement." Id. Comment 1 states in part:
"This section definitely rejects: (a) Any assumption that because a writing has been worked
out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters agreed upon
....." Id. § 2-202 cmt. 1. Equating writing with paper is inescapable. Nevertheless, it seems
that the intention is to refer to the parties' memorial of their transaction, without relying on
memory.
April 1993]
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cur. For example, section 2-605(1)(b) permits a merchant seller to make
a written request for a written statement of defects after goods have been
rejected.21 If a merchant buyer fails to specify defects in a written re-
sponse, the buyer is precluded from relying on such defects as a basis for
rejection of the goods. Section 2-609(1) permits a party to a sales con-
tract to demand adequate assurances of performance from the other
party, but only when reasonable grounds for insecurity exist and when
the demand is made in writing.22 If such a demand is communicated by
a writing, the recipient is required to furnish assurances within a reason-
able time, and failure to do so has the effect of a repudiation of the
agreement.
3. Ritual and precaution. Writings, and the formalities attendant
upon their reading and signing, may be used to impress upon parties to
agreements or transactions the significance of their actions. Indeed, this
ritual function is one that has been used to justify the continued existence
of the statutes of frauds. The provisions in Part 5 of Article 9 serve a
precautionary function by requiring that any debtor waivers of afforded
protections be made in writings signed subsequent to default in the
security agreement. Requirements that information be contained in
agreements or other writings in "conspicuous" form-such as the re-
quirements in section 2-316 that written disclaimers of implied warran-
ties be conspicuous-are similarly precautionary, intended to ensure that
even parties to standard-form, preprinted adhesion contracts are warned
of the risks imposed on them in the sales agreement.
4. Token or res. The writing itself may be a token, an item of
property that may be transferred and sold. Articles 3 and 7 define spe-
cific types of negotiable instruments that are created when writings are
issued and specify the consequences of transfer of such instruments to
good faith purchasers for value. In each case, when the appropriate de-
livery has occurred, the transferee acquires rights in the property-the
paper itself-which have legal consequences. In the provisions gov-
erning negotiable instruments, the fundamental assumption is that some
token exists on paper or other medium, which may be signed, issued and
physically delivered, and which may be transferred by indorsement and
delivery. Displacement of that fundamental assumption, without consid-
eration of and adjustment to its consequences, would play havoc with
significant elements of commercial markets.23
21. Id. § 2-605(l)(b).
22. Id § 2-609(1).
23. Some advocates of the emerging markets in electronic data have argued that it is ap-
propriate to redefine "written" and "writing" to include electronic data, notwithstanding the
Vol. 26:607
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B. Second Steps: Developing New Concepts for Commercial Law
Thus it becomes clear that when attempts to redefine "writings" to
incorporate electronic media are tested against the functions identified
above, a broadened definition will cause unacceptable distortion. Even if
paper is not essential to memorialize or evidence transactions, to commu-
nicate or give notice, or to serve ritual and precautionary functions, the
problem of the token remains. Reinterpreting or redefining the definition
of "writing" in section 1-201(46) to include electronic media would dis-
rupt the structure of Articles 3 and 7 and cloud the appropriate interpre-
tation of provisions in other articles dealing with the consequences of
negotiable instruments.
Furthermore, the experience garnered in the process of drafting Ar-
ticle 8, as it relates to uncertificated securities, and Article 4A, which
governs wire transfers, demonstrates that it is not sufficient to subsume
electronic media into provisions for paper-based information. The use of
electronic media may cause risks that are distinct from those implicit in
the use of paper, and other risks, common to both forms, may be of vary-
ing significance. Thus the 1977 revision of Article 8 contained separate
provisions governing transfers of interests in securities for certificated se-
curities-those printed on paper-and for uncertificated interests, ac-
counted for only on the records of an issuer or intermediary. Article 4A
contains provisions for security procedures to vouchsafe the authenticity
and accuracy of payment orders, while Article 3 uses signatures as the
vehicle for assuring authenticity.24
The beginning of a solution to the problems presented by technolog-
ical change is the definition of a new concept for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. This concept would embrace both paper-based and
electronically based communications and information storage. Its ele-
ments would be crafted carefully to ensure that those factors that are
characteristic of the traditional reliance on paper may be satisfied. In
instances where either medium is sufficient to serve the purposes of the
Code, the new concept would be used. In those instances where the
impact on the clearly paper-based assumptions contained in Articles 3 and 7. This author
disagrees and believes that the disruption of the existing structure of Article 3 in particular is
unacceptable. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that there is no reason why the conse-
quences of negotiability cannot exist in an electronic environment. Indeed, both Articles 4A
and 8 provide that, upon the occurrence of stated and objectively identifiable events, rights are
transferred free of claims and defenses.
24. In addition to its reliance on signatures, Article 3 contains a number of provisions
allocating the risk of forgeries to the party perceived to be in the best position to protect
against loss. See U.C.C. §§ 3-404 to -406. Article 4A, on the other hand, states specifically
that a signature is not a sufficient security procedure. I&. § 4A-201.
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drafters believe that electronically based information cannot serve the
functions of paper, the existing defined terms "written" or "writing"
would clearly signal that paper is required.
A necessary first step is to determine what it is about paper-based
information that permits it to serve the identified functions and then to
evaluate those characteristics against electronic information. After sub-
stantial debate, the Working Group2" concluded that the first essential
characteristic is the existence of a record of information that is capable of
being perceived or intelligible to humans. While words stored on paper
instantly qualify, the same is not true of words or information stored in
electronic form. Before humans may use information that has been
stored electronically, computer software must be applied to convert the
data into "plain English." The Working Group, however, did not believe
that the information must be stored in a legible form, as long as it is
capable of retrieval in a form intelligible to humans. Encrypted informa-
tion on paper is satisfactory for legal purposes. No principled distinction
between encrypted data and information stored electronically was identi-
fiable. The essential characteristic is that the information may be con-
verted accurately and reliably into a form that is intelligible to humans.
For encrypted information it would be necessary to retain the decoding
key or algorithm. In the case of information stored in electronic or other
technology-based media, this would mean that word processing or other
software be available to retrieve and reproduce the information in intelli-
gible form.
Secondly, the information must be reliable and accurate. One fun-
damental justification for requiring a memorial of information is the per-
ception that human memory is not always reliable. Any method of
storing information that permits the information to be accurately re-
trieved in the future eliminates the need to rely on human memory for
the reconstruction of a past transaction.
The information must be capable of communication in a manner
calculated to inform the recipient of its contents, or via a medium that
the recipient may be required to monitor at his or her peril. In the case
of communication and notice, an argument may be made that paper
should be required until the day arrives when all individuals and organi-
zations may be expected to utilize and monitor electronic mail systems.
25. At the commencement of the efforts outlined in this paper, the Working Group was
chaired by Thomas J. McCarthy (now chair of the Task Force on Article 2, Business Law
Section, ABA). It is now chaired by Terrance Maher and Henry Dyhouse. Development of
the concepts and processes discussed herein continues, as does analysis of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to identify explicit and implicit writing requirements and analyze their functions.
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Advocates of electronically based methods of business communication
argue, on the other hand, that retaining any requirement that paper be
used, particularly in commercial settings, hinders the acceptance of such
methods.26
Once it was agreed that redefinition was not feasible and that the
Code needed a defined term which would incorporate both paper and
nonpaper media, and after substantial debate, the following definition
was derived: "X is an intentionally created symbolic representation of
information, in an objectively observable medium or in a medium suscep-
tible to reduction to objectively observable form, with the potential to
last indefinitely. ' '27  This definition has the advantage of embracing
within its terms both paper-based and technology-based information,
while focusing attention on the need to store the information in a manner
permitting it to be understood by humans in the future. In addition, it
does not require that any particular, or even existing, method of stating
or storing the information be employed-it is technologically neutral.
The definition is silent concerning the need to store the information accu-
rately. It was the belief of the Working Group that accuracy was related
to the admissibility of the information and thus should be governed by
the rules of evidence.28
26. These advocates may be correct. Despite the fact that provisions of Article 4 prior to
the 1990 amendments arguably permitted check truncation and electronic presentment, bank-
ers consistently voiced concern about the feasibility of truncation systems without express au-
thorization for such systems.
27. The neutral label "X" was selected deliberately as the discussion commenced, in order
to avoid having connotations from preliminary or tentative labels obscure or confuse the
search for an appropriate definition.
28. At the same time that the Working Group was developing the "X" concept, other
bodies were addressing identical issues. The drafting committees revising Article 5 (Letters of
Credit) and Article 8 (Investment Securities) of the Uniform Commercial Code both were
struggling with the need to accommodate existing and predictable future uses of electronic
technologies in the creation and processing of transactions within the field governed by the
respective articles.
The May 1, 1992 draft of revised Article 8, reviewed by the NCCUSL at its 1992 Annual
Meeting, approached the problem in a manner consistent with the Working Group approach.
It affords a good example of how the Code might be revised once the drafters decide to incor-
porate a new concept into the Code that embraces both paper and nonpaper media. Revised
§ 8-103 defines securities in a manner that does not relate to the medium in which information
concerning the security is stored. U.C.C. § 8-103 (Tent. Draft May 1, 1992). Indeed, a "se-
curity" under revised § 8-103(f) "may, but need not be, represented by a certificate." Id. § 8-
103(f). The rights and liabilities incident to dealing with certificated securities are distinct
from the rights and liabilities incident to dealing with uncertificated securities, in both the 1977
version and the proposed revised version of Article 8.
More significantly, however, the 1992 draft of revised Article 8 avoids referring to writ-
ings or paper except as implicit in the references to the existence of a certificate. Instead, the
draft refers to communications, and defines a "communication" in revised § 8-105(6) as "a
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As was true at earlier stages of the debate when attempts were made
to redefine "writing," the preliminary definition was tested and found
wanting. There were objections to the requirement that the record be
intentionally created and the requirement that the information have the
potential to last indefinitely.
With respect to the requirement that the record be intentionally cre-
ated, it was pointed out that the definition in section 1-201(46) includes
"any other intentional reduction" to tangible form.29 On the other
hand, there is no requirement that any particular person record the infor-
mation, and the intent element appears to refer to the act of putting the
information into a record, rather than to any desire or motive to create a
record. Courts do not explore the motivation of individuals who tran-
scribe information before determining whether paper requirements are
satisfied.A There was concern that decision makers might regard any
element of tangibility as imposing requirements that the record be made
at some particular point in the course of a transaction or some particular
format. Participants in the debate did not wish to impose technological
limitations, which might hinder future technological innovation, by re-
taining definitional elements that were not essential to the functions or
characteristics identified.
Another element that raised concern was the requirement of a "po-
tential to last indefinitely." It was pointed out that paper does not and is
not required to last indefinitely. The Internal Revenue Service imposes
record-keeping requirements on commerce.31 Those requirements are
imposed quite independently of legal provisions requiring paper. Rules
concerning the admissibility and relevance of evidence similarly impose
signed writing or any other form of transmitting information and authenticating its source that
has been agreed upon by the persons transmitting and receiving the information." Id. § 8-
105(6). This definition is not identical to the concept developed by the Working Group, be-
cause the Article 8 "communication" requires that the sender and recipient of information
have previously agreed to use of the medium. The Working Group rejected any requirement
of prior agreement, focusing on the characteristics of the information or message rather than
on whether, in any particular situation and in relation to any particular parties, an appropriate
medium had been selected. Nevertheless, the overall drafting approach of revised Article 8 is
consistent with the Working Group's recommendations, because the existence of a writing is
assumed only in the case of certificated securities. In all other respects, "communications" are
required, and, as noted above, the definition of "communication" incorporates both paper and
nonpaper media for information.
29. U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1990).
30. Such motivational questions may be relevant on other points, such as whether the
record is intended as a full or partial integration of an agreement. They were not, however,
considered relevant to the question of whether the record is a "writing."
31. See Rev. Rul. 71-20, 1971-1 C.B. 392, and Rev. Proc. 86-19, 1986-1 C.B. 558, for
provisions relating to record retention in an electronic environment.
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requirements concerning durability and reliability of records, but these
rules also exist independently of paper requirements.32 Concern was ex-
pressed that including an indefinite duration requirement in the defini-
tion might be regarded as imposing requirements independent of (rather
than incorporating and restating) the needs for evidence and audit pur-
poses. On the other hand, it is clear that one of the characteristics of
paper records is that they may be relied upon to survive in unchanged
form over a period of time. Questions were raised concerning whether
the durability requirement related to the information, its symbolic repre-
sentation or the medium of storage, and thus it was agreed that the for-
mulation contained an inherent ambiguity. Finally, it was suggested that
the requirement that the record be capable of translation into an "observ-
able" form suggested a format that could be perceived by visual means,
rather than by any of the senses.
As a result of these discussions, the definition of the concept was
revised as follows:
X means a durable symbolic representation of information in
objectively perceivable form or susceptible to reduction to ob-
jectively perceivable form.
This definition involves several changes from its earlier form. While the
idea of a lasting record has been retained, it is clear that it is the represen-
tation of the information that must be durable. No element of intention-
ality has been retained; it is sufficient that a representation of the
information exists. Finally, the word "observable" has been changed to
"perceivable," permitting resort to any mode of perception.
C. Labelling X: Naming the Concept
For purposes of discussion, the new concept was labelled "X." No
word was attached to the new concept as it was being refined, in order to
avoid obscuring the search for the necessary elements of that concept
through connotations or inferences conveyed by any word that might be
selected as a preliminary label. Any word selected should not carry with
it a strong inference that a piece of paper exists, because such an infer-
ence could confuse the issue for the unwary. Thus such words as "text"
would be excluded. A new word might be created, but the use of "made
up" words carries with it the risk that the new word might create its own
confusion and contradict the style of existing UCC drafts.
32. See, e-g., FED. R. EVID. 1005.
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A number of words have been suggested, but at the moment "rec-
ord" is favored as a label for the concept. 3 The dictionary definitions of
the word "record" include the idea of "writing" something down, or
placing the information in some permanent or durable form. The word
also embraces the idea of a number of other media, including phono-
graphs, tapes and compact discs. Thus, the connotations borne by the
word "record" suggest the desired media neutrality.
III. CONCLUSION: THE PROCESS OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN THE
PROCESS OF LEGAL REFORM
New technologies are challenging both the commercial law and law-
yers in ways far more fundamental than may have been foreseeable even
a decade ago. 4 Experience with the commercial practices that have de-
veloped seems to be essential to effective revision of commercial law, if
only because that experience illustrates that existing conceptual
frameworks may be inadequate to the task of reform. With the benefit of
such experience, efforts can be made to avoid media-specific rules and to
anticipate future directions of technology. It must be acknowledged,
however, that these may be only efforts. Without the benefit of crystal
balls, perfect prediction of the direction and impact of future technolo-
gies is impossible. Perfection will not occur, but it is clear that existing
provisions of commercial law hinder commercial developments both in
the sphere of transaction processing and with respect to agreements in
which the subject of the transaction is technology. It is also clear that
efforts must be undertaken today to adapt commercial law, to the extent
practicable, to each of these circumstances.
One aspect of this challenge is the task of bringing computer
software and programming disputes into existing bodies of law. A task
force of the American Bar Association has spent several years studying
an appropriate method for accomplishing this, and the Article 2 drafting
33. Other suggestions have included terms such as advice, communicate or communica-
tion, document, memorial, message, representation and text. Thomas J. McCarthy prepared a
memorandum analyzing substitution of the word "document" for writing references in Article
2, as well as a similar analysis for the word "record." Memoranda from Thomas J. McCarthy,
Member, Working Group (on file with author).
34. Several years ago the author heard an address by Professor Peter W. Martin, in which
he compared the impact of electronically based information technologies to the impact of writ-
ing on preliterate societies. Professor Peter W. Martin, Address at the Meeting of Mid-
Continent Association of Law Schools (Summer, 1989). As farfetched as the idea may have
seemed to some, Professor Martin proceeded to illustrate numerous ways in which new tech-
nologies offered-new research techniques, and rendered obsolete existing techniques of legal
research. Id.
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committee has the subject under active consideration. 3 This Article il-
lustrates that a similar conceptual challenge exists when computers are
not the subject matter of the contract, but are the vehicle through which
the transaction has been conducted.
Conceptual change requires a frequently time-consuming and taxing
process or evolution of analysis. However, effective and efficient revision
of commercial law for the era of electronic media demands that revisers
submit to this process. Students and historians of cognitive processes
identified the process of conceptual development long ago: Concepts are
formed by individuals to explain the world they experience; once formed,
the concepts stabilize until, at some point, the individual will confront
new experiences that require reevaluation of the concept, which will then
destabilize and undergo modification until a new synthesis is achieved.36
The process that has become manifest as the definition of "writing" in-
cludes the elements of conceptual development consistent with these the-
ories. Experience with an existing concept-for example, "writing"-
revealed that it was flawed because it assumed that all records of infor-
mation involved the existence of a surface bearing words and numbers.
The assumption became false with the development of methods to store
and communicate information electronically. Attempts were made to
redefine the concept in order to accommodate new perceptions, but ulti-
mately the concept of "writing" was found wanting.
Once it has become apparent that existing concepts no longer fulfill
the needs of present realities, it is possible to develop new conceptual
structures. As has been manifested in the process of exploring "writing,"
it may be appropriate to retain the existing concept, supplementing it
with new concepts that address technological development. The ele-
ments or characteristics of the concept to be described may be identified
through analysis of both traditional and emerging commercial practices,
and with the help of substantial brainstorming and debate. When those
characteristics have been identified, it is possible to express them in
language.
The first attempts to express the characteristics of such a new con-
cept inevitably will require refinement and clarification. If commercial
35. For further information concerning these points, and analysis of their impact on the
Article 2 drafting process, see Raymond T. Nimmer, License Contracts-Article 2 Code Sec-
tions (Feb. 4, 1993) (prepared for Article 2 drafting committee) (on file with author).
36. The work of Jean Piaget on intellectual development is perhaps the most familiar to
American students. See JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD AND REALITY (1973). An excellent his-
torical investigation of how experiences influence perceptions of reality, and accompanying
conceptualizations of that reality, may be found in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS
(1983).
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law is to have relevance for commercial practices, a number of techno-
logical and legal experts must be willing to engage in a process of discus-
sion and debate. This process of discussion and debate must test
concepts against both recent experience with new technologies and long
experience with old technologies, as well as educated predictions of fu-
ture technologies. Such a process, however expensive and time consum-
ing, seems best calculated to successfully identify the insufficiency of
existing conceptual structures and to define new concepts that can sur-
vive marked technological shift and the challenges it poses for our legal
infrastructure.
In the particular instance of UCC paper requirements, incorporat-
ing into the Code's text a defined term embracing both paper- and
nonpaper-based information permits revisers to find real solutions to the
problems presented by electronically based commercial practices. Analy-
sis of the underlying functions served by writing requirements in the
UCC will reveal that, as a rule, pieces of paper are not necessary. It is
clear, however, that information stored or communicated in electronic
media cannot satisfy the policies being served by one of the writing re-
quirements-the token or property function-without causing major dif-
ficulties. With respect to other functions, drafters and legislators may
wish to demand that paper be used in some instances, notwithstanding
the fact that the information may be stored and communicated via elec-
tronic media. For these reasons, the quick fix of redefining or reinter-
preting the definition of "writing" will not solve the problems presented
by electronically based commerce. Real solutions necessarily start with
adding to the Code a defined concept that will include both paper-based
and nonpaper-based information. A possible definition for the new con-
cept is "record." Once this concept has been recognized, drafters and
legislatures may focus on the functions served by each writing require-
ment and determine whether paper is necessary. The bias should favor
eliminating specific paper requirements in the interests of encouraging
further commercial evolution of efficient business practices.
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